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We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an
equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the
difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coordination on the Pareto superior distribution.
While this is well in line with the recent models of inequity aversion, our results are best explained not by a
preference for equality per se but rather by the belief that the opponent has such a preference.
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1. Introduction
By now there seems to be broad agreement that in many contexts the traditional model of narrowly
self-interested individuals is not the most useful description of economic agents. There is overwhelming
experimental evidence that even in simple situations individual behavior involves more than just the
maximization of one’s own material payoff. In response to this evidence, a focus of recent research in0165-1765/$ -
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T. Chmura et al. / Economics Letters 88 (2005) 214–220 215behavioral economics has been the question of how to model the bsocial preferencesQ of agents, i.e., the
preferences over distributions of payoffs. Two influential approaches are the binequity aversion modelsQ
of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the one hand, and the bquasi-maximinQ
model of Charness and Rabin (2002) on the other hand. The inequity aversion models presume that
ceteris paribus agents prefer more equal distributions of payoffs, while the quasi-maximin model
emphasizes both the role of the worst-off individual and of the aggregate payoff for the group. There are
several studies that test the two approaches against each other. Engelmann and Strobel (2004), for
instance, find that in their simple bdictatorQ experiments the influence of both efficiency concerns and
maximin preferences is stronger than that of inequ(al)ity aversion; similar evidence is reported in
Kritikos and Bolle (2001). By contrast, Gu¨th et al. (2003) and Fehr et al. (2004) find that fairness
concerns dominate efficiency concerns. Herreiner and Puppe (2004) study the relevance of efficiency
versus equity considerations in a free-form bargaining context.
The purpose of the present study is to shed further light on the relative importance of fairness concerns
versus efficiency concerns. Specifically, in our experimental design (to be described in the next section)
bfairness concernsQ are represented by an aversion to payoff differences between two players, while
befficiency concernsQ correspond to a preference for (possibly unequal) distributions with higher total
payoff; in most cases considered here, higher total payoff in fact means Pareto improvement, i.e., both
players’ payoff increases. Two main conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, the coordination on
Pareto superior allocations is the more difficult the greater the asymmetry between the two players, i.e.,
the more unequal the resulting payoff distributions. In light of the evidence reported in Charness and
Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004), this re-establishes and confirms the importance of
inequity aversion as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Secondly,
and perhaps even more importantly, our results suggest that it is not so much inequity aversion per se but
rather the belief that others are driven by fairness concerns that best explains our observed behavior.2. Experimental setting and design
The game underlying our experiments is the following two-person normal form game. Both players
simultaneously choose either strategy E or F. The resulting payoffs are common knowledge (Fig.1).
We conducted two experiments. The first consisted of seven treatments ([T1]–[T7]) with different
values for the payoff vector (x1,x2) resulting from the choice of (E,E). Specifically, the treatmentsX2 0
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0 225
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Fig. 1. Payoff matrix.
Table 1
Relative frequency of decisions (player 1)
Player 1 [T1] [T2] [T3] [T4] [T5] [T6] [T7]
x1 375 375 250 325 375 400 475
x2 200 225 250 250 250 250 250
E 40% 55% 70% 80% 50% 60% 65%
F 60% 45% 30% 20% 50% 40% 35%
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(375,250) [T5] (400,250) [T6] and (475,250) [T7]. The second experiment featured the same game, but
there we held x2 fixed at 250 and let x1 steadily increase from 175 to 475 in steps of 5 units, resulting in
61 different distributions.
If both players are purely selfish (and if this is common knowledge), the game represents a simple
coordination game with two pure strategy Nash equilibria, namely (F,F) (both choosing the bfairQ
outcome, i.e., the equal distribution (225,225)) and (E,E) (both choosing the befficientQ outcome, i.e., the
distribution (x1,x2) which in almost all cases
1 maximizes the sum of the payoffs). Note that in [T2]–[T7]
the (E,E) equilibrium is in fact Pareto superior to the (F,F) equilibrium; the same holds in the second
experiment for all x1N225.
Our experiments were computerized2 and were conducted at the University of Bonn. Participants
were recruited from the campus mensa and had no previous training in economics or game theory. Each
participant played only one game and had to make exactly one decision. In total, 402 persons
participated. In the first experiment, each treatment consisted of 20 games with 2 players, thus a total
number of 7202=280 subjects participated in the first experiment. In the second experiment, each
of the games corresponding to the different payoff distributions was played only once, hence
612=122 subjects participated in the second experiment. Each participant was informed about the
game and his/her role as player 1 or player 2, but not about who the other player was. The game was
given in a matrix form, strategies were labeled A and B, and the instructions3 were given in a neutral
language to avoid framing effects.
After making their decision, subjects had also to fill out a questionnaire. Each subject received a lump
sum payment of 1o plus the individual payoff converted at a rate of 1 point=0.01o.4 If people failed
to coordinate, they nevertheless got 1o. The average earning in the first experiment was 2.49o, with
its minimum in [T3] at 1.88o and its maximum in [T6] at 2.80o. The average earning in the second
experiment was 2.94o. There were statistically significant differences in payoffs between the treatment
pairs [T1][T5], [T1][T6], [T2][T5], [T2][T6], [T3][T4], [T3][T5], [T3][T6] and [T3][T7].3. Experimental results
The experimental results from our first experiment are summarized in Tables 1–3. In the following,
special attention will be given to treatments [T3]–[T7] because in each of these the distribution resulting1 This is not true in the second experiment for distributions with x1b200.
2 The program was written in PASCAL using RATImage by Abbink and Sadrieh (1995).
3 Instructions and screenshots are available from the authors upon request.
4 Thus, for instance, a payoff of 275 points corresponds to 2.75+1.00=3.75 o.
Table 2
Relative frequency of decisions (player 2)
Player 2 [T1] [T2] [T3] [T4] [T5] [T6] [T7]
x1 375 375 250 325 375 400 475
x2 200 225 250 250 250 250 250
E 40% 70% 65% 65% 70% 70% 75%
F 60% 30% 35% 35% 30% 30% 25%
T. Chmura et al. / Economics Letters 88 (2005) 214–220 217from (E,E) (befficientQ outcome) is a strict Pareto improvement relative to the bfairQ outcome (225,225).
Player 2 always gets a payoff of 250. Player 1’s payoff increases from 250 in [T3] to 475 in [T7], so we
have an increasing inequality in payoffs between players 1 and 2.
Under inequity aversion this has the following behavioral implications. Specifically, assume as in
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (henceforth: [F/S]), that player i’s utility function ui is given by ui(xi,
xj)=xiai max(xjxi, 0)bi max(xixj, 0), where xi and xj are the payoffs of player i resp. j, and ai
and bi are parameters that measure i’s degree of aversion against disadvantageous resp. advantageous
inequality. As in [F/S], we assume that aizbi and 0VbiV1. Simple calculations show that in [T3]–[T7]
player 1’s best response is E to E and F to F, and that he/she always prefers the efficient distribution to
the fair distribution. By contrast, whether player 2 prefers the efficient distribution depends on her/his
individual a and the specific payoff difference in (E,E). The larger the difference, the less likely it is that
a player 2 will prefer (E,E) over (F,F) in [T4]–[T7]. If aN250/(x1250), strategy E is strictly dominated
by F for player 2, leaving the game with only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, namely (F,F).5
Similar considerations apply to [T1] and [T2].
Tables 1 and 2 show the relative frequency of the observed strategy choices.
In [T3], 70% of player 1 choose E, in [T4] it is even 80%. But then it drops significantly6 down to
50% in [T5], and although it rises again, it does not get beyond 65% in [T7]. On average, 65% of player
1 choose strategy E in [T3]–[T7]. In light of the [F/S]-predictions, this is a relatively small percentage.
Looking at the behavior of player 2, we see a slightly different trend. In [T3] it starts with only 65%
of subjects playing E, but then it rises steadily to 75% in [T7]. On average, 69% of player 2 choose
strategy E in [T3]–[T7]. Even if there are no significant differences between these treatments7, the
number of player 2 choosing E nonetheless rises with increasing inequity in (E, E). This is surprising in
view of the [F/S] model, which would predict a declining number of choices of E by player 2. Note that
even in the presence of inequity aversion, (E,E) can still be a Nash equilibrium of our simple
coordination game, as long as player 2’s a does not get too large. Thus, the [F/S] model certainly does
not always rule out choices of strategy E by either player. However, inequality aversion implies that the
probability of the choice of E by player 2 should decrease with increasing payoff difference, leaving the
game with just one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (F,F) in the extreme case.
Table 3 lists the observed distributions in the first experiment. The first row shows the number of
games resulting in the efficient distribution, the second row the number of games resulting in the fair7 Significance (Fisher) of 5% in [T1][T2], [T1][T5], [T1][T6], [T1][T7], and of 10% in [T1][T3], [T1][T4].
6 Significant at 5% level using a Fisher-Test. Other significant differences in behavior of player 1 are between [T1][T3] (5%
level), [T1][T4] (1% level), [T1][T7] (10% level) and [T2][T4] (10% level).
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Note, however, that for a situation with just one equilibrium to arise,
one needs a large a. In [T4]–[T7], the required a value would imply a rejection of a 25000/(x1+250) share in an ultimatum
bargaining game when the outside option equals 0. For example, the a needed in [T7] would lead to a rejection of an offer of
Table 3
Resulting distributions
[T1] [T2] [T3] [T4] [T5] [T6] [T7] [T3]–[T7] [T1]–[T7]
(E,E) 4 7 7 10 8 9 9 43 54
(F,F) 8 2 0 1 4 3 1 9 19
(E,F) 4 4 7 6 2 3 4 22 30
(F,E) 4 7 6 3 6 5 6 26 37
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result in the efficient distribution than in the fair distribution. This holds for all treatments except for
[T1]. In [T3]–[T7], we observe 43 efficient endings and only 9 fair ones. This might give the impression
that people are driven mainly by efficiency concerns, but it is in fact not evident. If we look at the
number of games in which one player chooses E while the other chooses F, we see that nearly half of all
games fall into this category (67 out of 140). Thus, efficiency concerns can at least not be common
knowledge.
Taking a closer look, one can distinguish two different cases of coordination failure. Either player 1 or
player 2 can be made bresponsibleQ for not reaching the efficient distribution by choosing strategy F.
Remarkably, the pattern of coordination failures changes from [T3] to [T7]. In [T3] we observe 6
instances of (F,E) versus 7 instances of (E,F), and in [T4] 3 instances of (F,E) versus 6 instances of
(E,F), thus in these two treatments the failure to reach the efficient outcome is more often due to player
2’s choice. By contrast, as is evident from Table 3, in [T5]–[T7] it is more often player 1 who is
responsible for not reaching the efficient outcome. Note that in the [F/S] model one would expect the
opposite pattern of behavior.
Inequity aversion does seem to influence players’ choices, but in a complex way. A clue can be found
by analyzing the questionnaires. When asked for the reason of their decision, many subjects wrote that
they tried to anticipate the other player’s choices and determined their own strategy based on that belief.
In our simple coordination game, we may thus take the actual strategy choice as an estimator of a
player’s belief. In view of this, our results suggest that it is not so much inequity aversion per se that
matters but rather the belief that the other player is inequity averse.8 Not surprisingly, the assessment of
the situation seems to be sensitive to the magnitude of the payoff difference in the efficient distribution.
In [T3] and [T4], when the difference is small, many player 1 think that player 2 will choose E because
they both can earn more by doing so, so we see a high percentage of player 1 choosing E. Around [T5],
there seems to be a turning point. Player 1 now seems to think that the other player regards the efficient
distribution as unfair, so we see many player 1 choosing F. In the extreme, if player 1 believes that
player 2’s inequity aversion is large enough to prefer (0,0) over (x1,x2), then in equilibrium player 1
must choose F because for player 2 F is a dominant strategy now. By contrast, player 2 seems to think
that player 1 will choose E because his/her payoff increases significantly, so in order to coordinate
player 2 chooses E. Thus, people appear to think too bbadlyQ about the other player’s attitude, and the
strength of this effect seems to be influenced by the size of the payoff difference resulting from (E,E).
To further examine this, we conducted the second experiment already described above. The results are
summarized by Figs. 2 and 3.8 Unfortunately, the players are often wrong in their estimation of the other player’s behavior, so they frequently fail to
coordinate.
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Fig. 2. Choice player 1.
T. Chmura et al. / Economics Letters 88 (2005) 214–220 219Fig. 2 shows the choices of player 1 for each x1(175Vx1V475), Fig. 3 shows the corresponding
choices of player 2. A dot at the top marks a choice of strategy E, a dot at the bottom a choice of F.9
Qualitatively, the trend for player 1 decisions is similar to the behavior observed in the first
experiment. For low x1 values they mostly choose E. Then, around x1=360, they seem to start to think
that the other player may choose F and play F more often.10 For high x1 values, fairness concerns are no
longer dominant and the choice of E is observed more often. The behavior of player 2 corresponds with
the results from our first experiment as well. After a variable beginning there is a remarkably long period
(from x1=325 to x1=440) with the constant choice of E. At the end the inequality seems to get too large
and F is again chosen sometimes. For both players, some choices of F are observed at high x1 values
after a period of constant choice of E. Remarkably, this period ends much later for player 2 than for
player 1, which again confirms the conjecture that the qualitative nature of our observations is due to
player 1’s beliefs rather than player 2’s actual social preferences.
Combining the choices, we see that in 62% of the cases the games result in the efficient distribution.
Only in 7% of the cases the fair outcome results, and in 31% of all cases the players fail to coordinate
and earn zero payoff. We thus have a much lower number of coordination failures than in our first
experiment, and a much higher number of efficient endings.1111 However, each x1 value was played only once in our second experiment, so the data basis is much weaker than in the first
experiment.
10 One could think that they care for fairness, but in the questionnaires many individuals explicitly wrote that they chose F
because they thought that the other player may do so.
9 The curves represent a polynomial trend (of fifth degree); they only serve for visualization of the results.
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Fig. 3. Choice player 2.
T. Chmura et al. / Economics Letters 88 (2005) 214–220220Summarizing, we find that efficiency concerns are important. But if inequality gets significant,
difference aversion hampers the coordination on an efficient and even Pareto superior outcome. Thus,
the disregard of equality in favor for unanimous improvement is at least not common knowledge.References
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